Memo #24
Yves Tiberghien
Japan and China just experienced one of their most intense confrontations in recent memory over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. This is more than an oddly outdated conflict over Westphalian sovereignty in a period of intense globalization. It is about the shifting balance of power and the absence of bilateral and regional institutions to manage the shift.
The detainment of a single Chinese fishing captain by Japanese prosecutors spiraled into the cancellation of all official bilateral meetings and full-blown pressure by China. China threatened embargo of exports of rare earth metals to Japan and there were members of the public threatening intervention into the Yen currency market. China also cancelled large-scale corporate tours to Japan and detained four Japanese businessmen on suspicions of spying.
What took place on September 7, 2010 is disputed but neither Japan nor China planned it. Grassroots actors, a daring Chinese fishing captain in search of fish, and a Japanese coast guard commander asserting control, were the sparks.
Beijing’s motives extend beyond muscle flexing. The Diaoyutai have symbolic meaning dating back to their annexation by Japan in 1895, the loss of Taiwan, and Japanese imperialism. Curiously, Beijing was relatively slow to respond to the collision and was pushed by public opinion within China as well as from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the larger Chinese diaspora abroad. With growing public participation in Chinese governance, these pressures were significant.
Japan calmly followed established procedures and its own laws, but did not anticipate the severity and weight of the Chinese reaction. Tokyo released the captain on September 25, 2010 after high-level political intervention. The short-circuiting of the judicial process may have weakened Japan’s claim to uncontested sovereignty.
It is sobering how such a small incident could degenerate so quickly into full-blown crisis. It underlines the need for a more robust institutional architecture to de-politicize economic relations between Japan and China. This would be easier to accomplish in a larger Northeast Asian context with other partners such as Korea involved. Precisely to avoid such crises between France and Germany, Jean Monnet initiated the process of European integration in 1950.
Immediate management depends upon cool-headed efforts to share sovereignty between the two nations in a way that seeks positive common returns, rather than zero-sum outcomes.
About the Author:
Yves Tiberghien is the Director of the Institute of Asian Research and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia; Executive Director of the China Council, and a Senior Fellow with the Global Summitry Project at the Munk School, University of Toronto.
Links:
- Japan’s action off Diaoyu raises concerns, China Daily, September 10, 2010
- Why Japan-China Spat Hurts Both, The Diplomat, September 13, 2010
- Prescription to end territorial row: Japan and China should think beyond logic of sovereignty, The Asahi Shimbun, September 23, 2010
- Dear Japan: Choose your actions wisely, China.org.cn, September 24, 2010
Related Memos:
- See Yves Tiberghien’s Memo, Sino-European Hope for the G20 in 2011 (Memo #63)